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[Lady Macbeth] Go get some water,
And wash this filthy witness from your hand.
Why did you bring these daggersfrom the place?
They must lie there. Go carry them; and smear
The sleepy grooms with blood.
[Macbeth] I'll go no more.
I am afraid to think what I have done;
Look on 't again I dare not.
[Lady Macbeth] Infirm of purpose!
Give me the daggers. The sleeping and the dead
Are but as pictures; 'tis the eye of childhood
Thatfears a painted devil. If he do bleed,
I'll gild the faces of the grooms withal;
For it must seem their guilt.
[Knock, knock]
[Macbeth] Whence is that knocking?
How is't with me, when every noise appals me?
What hands are here? ha! they pluck out mine eyes.
Will all greatNeptune's ocean wash this blood
Cleanfrom my hand? No, this my hand will rather
The multitudinous seas incarnadine,
Making the green one red.
[Lady Macbeth] My hands are of your colour; but I shame
To wear a heart so white.
[Knock, knock] I hear a knocking
At the south entry. Retire we to our chamber.
A little water clears us of this deed;
How easy is it then! Your constancy
Hath left you unattended.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Because every man's house is his castle and fortress, the English common law
required a representative of the Crown to announce his presence and state his
purpose before executing a civil writ.2 Yet, with the knock on the door, offenders

1.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH, act 2, sc. 2.

2.

Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96 (K.B. 1603).
The house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress, as well as for his defence against
injury and violence, as for his repose; and although the life of man is a thing precious and
favoured in law; so that although a man kills another in his defence, or kills one per infortun',
without any intent, yet it is felony, and in such case he shall forfeit his goods and chattels, for
the great regard which the law has to a man's life; but if thieves come to a man's house to rob
him, or murder, and the owner of his servants kill any of the thieves in defence of himself and
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such as the Macbeths are put on notice that they are in imminent danger of being
discovered with incriminating evidence on their persons. Had the people at the gate
been officers of the Crown, rather than Macduff and Lennox,3 one might question
the wisdom in requiring that they knock on the door before entering. Arguably, it
unnecessarily warned the perpetrators of the presence of the law, thereby allowing
them to literally wash the blood off their hands.
The knock and announce requirement has been justified as necessary for the
protection of the searching officers from being mistakenly identified as burglars.4
In addition, the requirement protects the privacy of the subject of the search,5
allowing him a moment to put his personal effects in order before the officers'
entry. 6 The knock and announce requirement is codified in Title 18 of the United
States Code,7 and is considered a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment.8 Evidence obtained directly or indirectly as a result of an
unreasonable search or seizure is generally not admissible at trial under the
exclusionary rule. 9 But if the evidence would inevitably have been discovered
through an independent line of investigation, it is not subjected to this exclusion.' °
The federal circuit courts are split on whether the alternative investigation must
have been initiated and actively pursued at the time of the initial discovery or
seizure."
Recent state court decisions disagree on whether the exclusionary rule is
applicable to knock and announce violations, and whether illegally seized evidence
should nevertheless be admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. 2 The

his house, it is not felony, and he shall lose nothing, and therewith agree 3 E. 3. Coron. 303, &
305. & 26 Ass. pl.23. So it is held in 21 H. 7. 39. every one may assemble his friends and
neighbours to defend his house against violence: but he cannot assemble them to go with him to
the market, or elsewhere for his safeguard against violence: and the reason of all this is, because
domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium.
Id.
3. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, act 2, sc. 3.
4. Craig Hemmens, I Hear You Knocking: The Supreme Court Revisits the Knock and Announce Rule,
66 UMKC L. REV. 559, 565 (1998).
5. Id. But putting one's "personal effects in order" does not include the destruction of incriminating
evidence.
6. United States v. Kane, 637 F.2d 974, 977 (3d Cir. 1981).
7. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3109 (West 2000).
8. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) (observing, that "[gliven the longstanding
common-law endorsement of the practice of announcement .... [there is] little doubt that the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer's entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be
considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure").
9. See generally Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (requiring the return of personal
effects seized after a violation of the Fourth Amendment, thus precluding those effects from being admitted into
evidence against the accused).
10. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (adopting the inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule).
11. See discussion infra Part II.D.3.
12. Compare Lee v. State, 774 F.2d 1183, 1192 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001), with People v. Vasquez, 602
N.W.2d 376, 378-79 (Mich. 1999), and People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53, 62 (Mich. 1999), cert. denied sub
nom Stevens v. Michigan, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000).

2004 / Knock, Knock. What's Inevitably There?
first section of this paper provides a background on the Fourth Amendment, the
knock and announce requirement in federal courts, and the exclusionary rule and
its exceptions. The following section analyzes whether the exclusionary rule is an
appropriate remedy for knock and announce violations, and whether the doctrine of
inevitable discovery bars the exclusion of evidence seized after such a violation.
This study asserts that the exclusionary rule should be applied to violations of the
knock and announce procedure because, unless justified by exigent circumstances,
its omission renders the entire search or seizure unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Furthermore, the doctrine of inevitable discovery should not be
applicable to knock and announce violations, because otherwise the searching
officer can willfully omit the knock-announce procedure knowing any evidence
discovered will be admitted nonetheless. Thus, the exclusionary rule will in effect
be eliminated as a remedy for the constitutional violation, which ultimately will
undermine the privacy protection offered by the Fourth Amendment.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

The Fourth Amendment and the Preferencefor Obtaining Warrants

The federal government is a government of limited powers, and it may not
infringe upon areas of control reserved to the states or upon certain fundamental
rights vested in the individual citizen. 3 A right of the citizens "to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" is
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment.' 4 A search or seizure is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment if, prior to its execution, the agent of government can articulate
a justification for the search based on the facts known to him at that time. 5
Depending
and
invasiveness of the search, either a reasonable
•
16 on the scope
17
suspicion or probable cause must support the intrusion. The U.S. Supreme Court
has expressed a preference for obtaining a warrant, whenever practicable, before
executing a search or seizure." The search or seizure must be preceded by a

13. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
16. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed is
sufficient to warrant a pat down for the presence of a weapon). A reasonable suspicion does not require the
officer to "be absolutely certain that the individual is armed"; the standard is "whether a reasonably prudent
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." In
addition, "due weight must be given ... to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from
the facts in light of his experience." Id.
17. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963). Probable cause does not require evidence
sufficient to convict, but merely "evidence which would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that
a felony has been committed." Id. (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162).
18. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964) (noting that "'the informed and deliberate
determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants ... are to be preferred over the hurried action of
officers who may happen to make arrests"' (quoting United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932))).
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probable cause determination made by a neutral and detached magistrate,' 9 and
20
must be based upon an oath or affirmation made under penalty of perjury. To
further limit the intrusion into an individual's zone of privacy, the Fourth
Amendment demands the warrant shall "particularly describe[] the place to be
searched, and the persons or [items] to be seized.'
Although the Fourth Amendment favors antecedent judicial approval of
searches or seizures "whenever practicable," 22 the vast majority of searches and
seizures are made without first obtaining a warrant.23 Such warrantless searches are
frequently upheld because the Supreme Court has recognized a limited set of
24
circumstances in which the failure to obtain a warrant is excused. As a general
exception, a warrant is never required in the presence of exigent circumstances
such as an imminent danger that the suspect will escape or that evidence will be
removed or destroyed)5' A warrant is not required for the making of an arrest in a
public place, providing the arresting officer has probable cause to believe the
suspect is a felon. 26 A warrant is, in addition, not required for the search of a
vehicle 27 or a container within a vehicle. 28 Furthermore, a police officer does not
need a warrant to conduct a "protective sweep" of the premises incident to a lawful
arrest, 29 nor to conduct a search pursuant to a routine police procedure such as an
and
inventory of an impounded vehicle. 3° In addition, a suspect's person
possessions may be searched during an in-station inventory following arrest.3'

19. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Id.
22. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
23. See generally Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors,
and IncidentalRights in ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure,99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1038 (2001).
24. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that "searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-defeated exceptions") (footnote omitted).
25. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971).
26. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418-19 (1976) (relying on the "common-law rule that a
peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence
as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest").
27. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (holding that the constitutionally protected privacy
interest in an automobile is significantly less than in a home or an office). In addition, the mobility of vehicles
such as boats and automobiles warrants a lesser degree of protection. Id.
28. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1991) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
824 (1982)).
29. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (authorizing the "search of the arrestee's person and
the area 'within his immediate control,"' i.e. "the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence"); see also Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1990) (extending the "protective
sweep" to areas immediately adjoining the place of arrest wherefrom an attack by third persons could be
launched).
30. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1987). However, warrantless searches of impounded
vehicles are upheld only if conducted in good faith and pursuant to standardized criteria. Id.
31. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983) (upholding reasonable administrative searches aimed
at preventing theft by and false claims against the stationhouse employees, and preserving the security of the
stationhouse).
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B. The Knock and Announce Requirement

Consistent with the old adage that every man's home is his castle and fortress,
a warrant is generally required for the entry into a dwelling.32 A warrantless entry
into the home of another is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and
can be justified only by the presence of exigent circumstances.33 Indeed, "physical
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed.... .,,4 As an additional layer of privacy protection offered
the occupants of a dwelling, the common law recognized a requirement for the
agent of government to knock and announce his or her identity and purpose before
forcing his way into a home.35 This knock and announce requirement was codified
in 1917, expressly conditioning a federal agent's right to forcibly enter a home to
execute a warrant upon the preceding announcement of his authority and purpose.36

32. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). Payton distinguished the common law rule for
felony arrests in public places because of the "overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been
embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic." Id. at 601. See also Miller v. United States, 357
U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (quoting Pitt's address to the House of Commons in March 1763, stating
[t]he poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail;
its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but
the King of England cannot enter-all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement!
Id.
33. Payton, 445 U.S. at 589-90; see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) ("Any
assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search
warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to
a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.").
34. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
35. Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96 (K.B. 1603) (articulating the earliest known requirement
for knock and announce).
In all cases when the King is party, the Sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party's
house either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the K.'s process, if otherwise he cannot
enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request
to open doors; and that appears well by the stat. of Westm. 1.c.17. (Which is but an affirmance
of the common law) as hereafter appears, for the law without a default in the owner abhors the
destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which
great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no default is in him; for
perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he had notice, it is to be presumed that he
would obey it, and that appears by the book in 18 E. 2. Execut. 252. where it is said, that the
K.'s officer who comes to do execution, may open the doors which are shut, and break them, if
he cannot have the keys; which proves, that he ought first to demand them....
Id. See also Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822) (the first known American case to adopt the knock and
announce rule).
36. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3109 (West 2000).
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a
house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and
purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him
in the execution of the warrant.
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Prior to 1995, knock and announce violations were analyzed under the
common law,37 or under section 3109," rather than being subject to constitutional
scrutiny. As early as 1963, the Supreme Court in Ker v. Californiahad suggested
that the manner in which warrants were executed should be measured by the
reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment.39 Nevertheless, five years after
deciding Ker, the Court revisited the knock and announce principle but resorted to
interpretation of section 3109 rather than constitutional analysis. 40 Faced with
growing confusion among lower courts as to the proper legal foundation for the
requirement, the Supreme Court granted certiorari irf'Wilson v. Arkansas to resolve
the issue of whether the knock-announce principle was part of the Fourth
41
Amendment reasonableness inquiry.
1. Wilson v. Arkansas
In Wilson, police officers entered the petitioner's apartment with a valid search
warrant, and discovered drugs and related paraphernalia, as well as the petitioner
flushing marijuana down the toilet.42 The petitioner was arrested on charges of
possession and delivery of controlled substances, and sought to suppress the
evidence on grounds that the police failed to knock and announce before entering
her apartment. 43 The motion was denied, and the petitioner was convicted." A
unanimous Supreme Court reversed and remanded the conviction, 5 holding that
under some circumstances an officer's failure to knock and announce might be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 6 However, the court noted that in
spite of its constitutional endorsement, the requirement is not inflexible and the
presence of exigent circumstances may justify its omission. 47

37. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1958) (applying a District of Columbia law
requiring the police to announce their purpose before breaking the curtilage).
38. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968) (holding that the knock and announce procedure is
required under section 3109 unless the officers have a substantial basis for their belief that notice and
announcement would be unnecessary due to the existence of exigent circumstances).
39. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 39 (1963) (holding that in order to determine whether a search was
conducted incident to a lawful arrest, the court must determine whether "the method of entering the home" to
conduct the arrest offends "federal constitutional standards of reasonableness and therefore vitiate[s] the legality
of [the] accompanying search").
40. Sabbath, 391 U.S. at 588-91.
41. 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995).
42. Id. at 929.
43. Id. at 930.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 934. The Court found that, "[g]iven the longstanding common-law endorsement of the practice
of announcement," there was "little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of
an officer's entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a
search or seizure." Id.
47. Id. at 934-35. The Court explicitly declined to consider the factors that may justify omission of the
knock-announce requirement, leaving that determination to the lower courts. Id. at 936.
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2.

Richards v. Wisconsin

Two years after deciding Wilson, the Supreme Court had to reconsider the
flexibility of the reasonableness inquiry and decide whether there were
circumstances in which a no-knock entry could always be justified. 48 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court allowed law enforcement officers to omit the knock
and announce requirement during felony drug investigations. 49 According to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, it was reasonable to dispense with the knock and
announce requirement because of the inherent danger to the officers involved,
and the likelihood evidence would be destroyed. 5° A unanimous U.S. Supreme
Court disagreed on two grounds.5 First, the stated dangers of a felony drug
investigation constituted "considerable overgeneralization[s]" and failed to take
into account the situations in which such dangers were so minimal so as to be
outweighed by the individual privacy interests involved."' Second, the court
found that a crime-specific exception could easily be created for other categories
of investigations, eventually rendering the knock and announce requirement
entirely meaningless.53 Thus, whether exigent circumstances warrant a no-knock
entry must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and the Fourth Amendment
does not permit the codification of a blanket exception to the rule that would
insulate the determination from judicial review. Rather, a no-knock entry may
be justified by the agent's "reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing
their presence, under the .. . circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or...
would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime.... 1'55
3.

U.S. v. Ramirez

Richards implicitly sanctioned the use of no-knock warrants, if sufficient
cause for the issuance of such a warrant "can be demonstrated ahead of time. 56

48. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1997).
49. State v. Richards, 549 N.W.2d 218, 227 (Wis. 1996).
50. Id. at 225.
51. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. at 393-94.
52. Id. at 393. The Court suggested that the "search could be conducted at a time when the only
individuals present ... have no connection with the drug activity and thus will be unlikely to threaten off icers or
destroy evidence." Id. Further, "the police could know that the drugs being searched for were of a type or in a
location that made them impossible to destroy quickly." Id.
53. Id. at 393-94.
54. Id. at 394.
55. Id. Notably, Richard's conviction was upheld because the police had a reasonable suspicion to
believe that he might have destroyed the evidence "if given further opportunity to do so." Id. at 395.
56. Id. at 396 n.7
The practice of allowing magistrates to issue no-knock warrants seems entirely reasonable
when sufficient cause to do so can be demonstrated ahead of time. But ... a magistrate's
decision not to authorize a no-knock entry should not be interpreted to remove the officers'
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The Supreme Court next had to decide whether the need to use force when
entering a house pursuant to such a warrant must also be demonstrated and
authorized." Hernan Ramirez was suspected of housing an escaped felon
described as armed and dangerous.5 8 A no-knock warrant was issued, and police
entered his house in the early hours of the morning." In doing so, they broke a
single window of the garage. 6° Even though the escaped convict was not found,
Ramirez was arrested on gun possession charges. 6' He sought to suppress the
seizure of the gun, arguing that there were insufficient exigent circumstances to
warrant the destruction of property. 62 According to the Ninth Circuit, because the
Fourth Amendment governs the manner in which a warrant is executed, the
destruction of property during a no-knock entry requires a higher standard of
proof than the "reasonable suspicion" standard enumerated in Richards.63 The
Supreme Court disagreed, finding neither Wilson nor Richards compelled such a
conclusion.6 The existence of a "reasonable suspicion" in no way depends on
whether property must be destroyed in order for the police to enter. 65 However,
measured by the reasonableness standard, "[e]xcessive [and/]or unnecessary
destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth
In the instant case,
Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful .... ,66
though, the breaking of the single window of the Ramirez residence was deemed
reasonable.67

authority to exercise independent judgment concerning the wisdom of a no-knock entry at the
time the warrant is being executed.
Id.
57. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 70-71 (1998).
58. Id. at 68.
59. Id. at 68-69.
60. Id. at69. The police had been told by a confidential informant that the garage might contain a stash
of guns and drugs. Id. at 68-69.
61. Id. at 69. Ramirez was a convicted felon. Id.
62. Id. at 69-70. The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the suppression of the evidence obtained after the forced
entry, found that whereas a mild exigency is sufficient to justify a no-knock entry that can be accomplished
without the destruction of property, "[m]ore specific inferences of exigency are necessary" when property is
destroyed. United States v. Ramirez, 91 F.3d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Becker, 23
F.3d 1537, 1541 (9th Cir. 1994) (alteration in original)).
63. Ramirez, 91 F.3d at 1301, overruledby Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 69-70.
64. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 70-71.
65. Id.at71.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 71-72. The Court found it reasonable to break the window in order to discourage the refugee,
or any other occupant of the house, from rushing to the weapons that allegedly were kept there. Id.
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C. The Exclusionary Rule
1. The Weeks Doctrine
In Weeks v. United States, the petitioner was arrested and charged with use of
the mails for the purpose of transporting lottery tickets and related paraphernalia. 68
Subsequent to his arrest, state and U.S. law enforcement officers entered his
apartment without a warrant and seized papers and other personal effects, some of
which were admitted into evidence at his trial.69 The petitioner moved the court for
the return of his property, alleging that the warrantless seizure was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment and, consequently, the district attorney wrongfully
held the papers. 70 The Supreme Court agreed that the seizure was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, and because of the constitutional violation, the
papers were wrongfully obtained.7 Therefore, consistent with common law
precedents, the papers and other effects should have been returned to the petitioner
and not admitted into evidence.
2.

Incorporation

By its express language, the Weeks decision was restricted to the papers
illegally seized by the federal officers. 73 According to the Court, Fourth
Amendment protection was limited to actions taken under a claim of federal
authority. 74 This view was repudiated thirty-five years later in Wolf v. Colorado,75
where the Supreme Court found that the rights guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment are basic to a free society, and as such are "implicit in the concept of

ordered liberty. 76 Consequently, the Fourth Amendment guarantees apply to the

several states through incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 28.

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 386 (1914).
Id at 386-88.
Id. at 388-89.
Id. at 398.
Id.
Id.
Id.
338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. at 27-28 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
Id. According to the Court,
[tihe knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude to a search, without authority
of law but solely on the authority of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history
to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the history
and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples.
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However, the Wolf Court declined to extend due process protection to the
exclusionary remedy." At the time Wolf was decided, the majority of states had
rejected the Weeks doctrine.7 9 In addition, the Court noted that none of the
jurisdictions within the United Kingdom or the British Commonwealth adhered to
a rule similar to Weeks even after having decided similar questions.'s Thus, because
most of the English-speaking world did not find the exclusionary remedy vital to
protect the fundamental interests at stake, the Supreme Court declined to treat the
Weeks doctrine as an essential ingredient to the Fourth Amendment rights falling
within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8
The Supreme Court overruled Wolf's narrow view of the applicability of the
exclusionary rule in 1961, when deciding Mapp v. Ohio. 2 In Mapp, the Court
observed that the rule of exclusion enunciated in Weeks was not simply a limitation
on the admissibility of evidence seized in violation of a constitutional right; it was
of itself a rule of constitutional origin. 3 Thus, although the Fourth Amendment
does not expressly limit the use of evidence obtained in violation of its tenets, it
implicitly prohibits the use of any evidence so procured.84 Because the exclusionary
rule is judicially inferred from the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, it
is consequently encompassed within the boundaries of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 In addition, the Court maintained that due process protection of the
substantive right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was rendered
valueless by the failure to include the most important constitutional privilege-the
exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the substantive right." According to the
Court, this failure was "to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment. '
3. Purposes Behind the ExclusionaryRule
According to the Wolf court, the exclusionary rule was not a necessary
ingredient of Fourth Amendment protection in part because private causes of action

78. Id. at 28-33.
79. Id. at 29. The Court found that whereas sixteen states adhered to the Weeks decision, thirty states had
rejected it. Id.
80. Id. at 30. These included England, Scotland, Canada, Australia and India. Id. at app. A at 39.
81. Id. at 31-33. The Court concluded that even though exclusion may be an effective remedy, "it is not
for this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's
reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective." Id. at 31.
82. 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
83. Id. at 649.
84. Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928)).
85. Id. at 655-58. The Court noted that it was aware of no similar restraint "conditioning the
enforcement of any other basic constitutional right." The Court enforced against "the states the rights of free
speech and of a free press, the rights to notice and to a fair, public trial, including ... the right not to be
convicted by use of a coerced confession ..."Id. at 656.
86. Id. at 655-56.
87. Id. at 656.
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against the offending officers were available.8 Violations of the Fourth
Amendment may thus be redressed through suits in tort and under the Civil Rights
Acts, and unconstitutional conduct may be further deterred and punished through
departmental disciplinary actions against the individual officer." In the years
following Wolf, however, many states reevaluated their use of the exclusionary rule
because the alternative remedies did not efficiently deter the violations of
individual liberties. 90 For instance, the California Supreme Court, in adopting the
Weeks doctrine, found that it was compelled to do so
because other remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with
the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with the
attendant result that the courts under the old rule have been constantly
required to participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of
law enforcement officers.
Experience has demonstrated, however, that neither administrative,
criminal nor civil remedies are effective in suppressing lawless searches
and seizures. The innocent suffer with the guilty, and we cannot close our
eyes to the effect the rule we adopt will have on the rights of those not
before the court.9'
In the years before Mapp, the U.S. Supreme Court had also noted that the
alternative remedies offered insufficient constitutional protection against
unreasonable state action. 92 Thus, the Mapp Court's decision to make the Weeks
doctrine a rule of constitutional origin was in part based on the failure of other
remedies to provide meaningful protection to the constitutional interests at stake.93
Consistent with its constitutional origin, the exclusionary rule is not applied as
a penalty for the constitutional violation, but rather as a deterrent and incentive for
the agents of government to abstain from future unconstitutional acts. 94 Thus,

88. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 & n.1, 31 & n.2 (1949). In addition, the Court noted that one
factor warranting a distinction between federal and local law enforcement with respect to sanctions was that
"[tihe public opinion of a community can far more effectively be exerted against oppressive conduct on the part
of police directly responsible to the community itself than ... [against] remote authority pervasively exerted
throughout the country." Id. at 32-33.
89. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
90. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651.
91. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911-13 (Cal. 1955).
92. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 137 (1954) (noting that the innocent party to an
unreasonable search was unlikely to complain, and an accused, absent the exclusion of evidence, has nothing to
gain from disclosing the illegality at trial).
93. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651-53. The Court cited California's failure to compel compliance with the
constitutional provisions, and the fact that more than half the states had adopted a rule similar to Weeks at that
time. Id. The Court concluded that whatever factual considerations supported the Wolf court in excluding the
Weeks exclusionary rule when recognizing the enforceability of the Fourth Amendment against the states in
1949 could not be deemed controlling anymore. Id.
94. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600 (1975).
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exclusion of illegally seized evidence "compel[s] respect for the constitutional
guaranty... by removing the incentive to disregard it." 95 In furtherance of its
deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule is only applied where its remedial
objectives are most efficiently served and outweigh the societal costs of its
invocation.9 Hence, "'the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe
the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons."' 97
In addition to its deterrent purpose, it has been suggested that the rule also
serves a vital function as an "imperative of judicial integrity." ' For example, by
securing the conviction of a criminal with evidence illegally seized, the
government enforces the criminal statute by violating a constitutional right.
Therefore, the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence will ensure that the judicial
branch does not make itself an accomplice to, nor expressly or implicitly sanction
an officer's willful disobedience of the law. 9 In the words of Justice Clark, "Itihe
criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free."' °
D. Exceptions to the Rule
1. Fruitof the PoisonousTree Doctrine
In order to preserve society's interest in efficient crime prevention and
prosecution, the exclusionary rule is only applied to evidence that was obtained
through the exploitation of illegal police conduct.' ° ' In Wong Sun v. United States,
federal narcotics agents arrested two persons-Toy and Yee-on suspicions they
were involved in heroin dealing.i°e The arrests Were neither supported by probable
cause nor conducted pursuant to lawfully obtained warrants, and therefore they
constituted unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment.' °3 Yee possessed
some heroin, and Toy implicated Wong Sun as its source both verbally and in a

95. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
96. See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (noting that because of the
significant costs associated with the exclusion of incriminating evidence, the exclusionary rule is only
applicable to criminal trials, and not other proceedings such as grand jury investigations, United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-46 (1974), civil tax proceedings, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54
(1976), or civil deportation proceedings, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984)).
97. Brown, 422 U.S. at 600 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348).
98. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469, 471 (1928) (Holmes &
Brandeis, JJ., dissenting)).
99. Id. at 222-23; see also Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]o declare
that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against
that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.").
100. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,659 (1961).
101. Calandra,414 U.S. at 347-48.
102. 371 U.S. 471, 473-75 (1963).
103. Id. at 477-84. Arrest warrants were issued on the date of Toy and Yee's arraignments, but no
warrants were outstanding on the day of the actual arrests. Id. at 475 n.3.
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written unsigned statement made voluntarily after his arrest.' 4 After his arrest,
Wong Sun was released on his own recognizance. 1°5 He later returned to the
Narcotics Bureau and made a voluntary statement which he refused to sign,
although he admitted to its accuracy.106
Petitioners Yee and Wong Sun sought to exclude Toy's verbal statement, the
unsigned written statements and the seized heroin as fruits of the unlawful searches
and seizures.'0 The Supreme Court found that Toy's statements were not
admissible against Toy because they were tainted by his unlawful arrest."'0 Further,
Wong Sun's statements were not admissible against Toy, as they constituted
uncorroborated declarations by a partner-in-crime.' 6 However, the taint of the
unlawful seizure of Toy and Yee had no effect on the evidence against Wong
Sun." ° According to the Court, evidence is not "'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply
because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police."'' 1
Rather, the appropriate question is "whether, granting establishment of the primary

illegality, the evidence.., has been [obtained] by exploitation of that illegality
or... by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.""..
2.

Independent Source Doctrine

Consistent with the notion that the exclusionary rule only requires suppression
of evidence obtained from the exploitation of a police illegality,"3 evidence
discovered through sources or means wholly independent from the illegality is also

admissible.

"1

In Segura v. United States, federal narcotics agents had probable

104. Id. at 474-77.
105. Id. at 475.
106. Id. at 476-77. Wong Sun had difficulties understanding the statement in English, and had the
substance of it recited in Chinese by an agent of the Narcotics Bureau. Id.
107. Id. at 477.
108. Id. at 479-91. The Court found that the information the officers had at their disposal when arresting
Toy did not amount to probable cause, and no attempt to obtain a warrant was made. Thus, the incriminating
statements made subsequent to the unlawful arrest were excluded as fruits of the poisonous tree. Id.
109. Id. at 488-91. The Court came to this conclusion by joining two converging lines of precedents. Id.
at 488. First, "a conviction must rest upon firmer ground than the uncorroborated admission or confession of the
accused." Id. at 488-89 (relying on Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954); Opper v. United States,
348 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1954)). Second, "an out-of-court declaration made after arrest may not be used at trial
against one of the declarant's partners in crime." Id. at 488 (relying on Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211,
217 (1946)).
110. Id. at 491-93. The evidence was excluded with respect to Toy because of its tainted relationship to
his unlawful arrest, and not because of any government improprieties in its surrender by Yee. Thus, the seizure
of the drugs "invaded no right of privacy of person or premises which would entitle Wong Sun to object" to its
introduction. Id.
111. Id. at 487-88.
112. Id. at 488. In the case of Wong Sun, his voluntary return to the police station to make a statement
rendered the connection between the confession and the unlawful arrest "so attenuated so as to dissipate the
taint" of the illegality. Id. at 491 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
113. See discussion supra Part II.D. I.
114. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984).
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cause to arrest Segura and others based on information from surveillance and other
sources. 15 Due to a so-called "administrative delay," the officers had not obtained a
search warrant for Segura's apartment at the time of his arrest."' However, incident
to his arrest, the agents entered the apartment and conducted a limited security
check of the premises." 7 The warrantless search revealed various drug
paraphernalia in plain view. " ' The federal agents secured the premises for some
nineteen hours while the search warrant was being prepared and issued. " 9 The
ensuing search resulted in the discovery of cocaine and evidence of drug
transactions. Segura sought to suppress all evidence, alleging it was tainted by
the initial illegal entry into his apartment."' The U.S. -Supreme Court disagreed,
and held that evidence need not be excluded if discovered through a source wholly
independent from the illegal entry and search. 22 Evidence so discovered may be
introduced and proved regardless of the occurrence of illegal police conduct during
the investigation.'3 Thus, because the search warrant was sought before, and on
information wholly independent from, the illegal entry, the evidence was
admissible 2"
In 1988, the Supreme Court extended the independent source exception to an
illegal search and seizure performed before a warrant had been applied for.' In
Murray v. United States, federal law enforcement agents observed the petitioners
leave a Boston warehouse in two vehicles.2 6 After the vehicles were turned over to
other drivers, they were stopped and searched and found to contain marijuana."'
The federal agents returned to the warehouse, and upon entry discovered numerous
bales of marijuana. 28 After leaving the premises, the agents applied for and
obtained a search warrant for the warehouse, and upon entry, seized 270 bales of

115. Id. at 799-800.
116. Id. at 800-01. Indeed, the search warrant application "was not presented to the Magistrate until 5
p.m." the following day-a nineteen hour delay from the time the agents initially entered the apartment. Id. at
801.
117. Id. at 800-01. It is undisputed that the entry into the apartment was illegal, as the agents entered
without seeking or obtaining permission from the residents.
118. Id. at 801.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 805 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).
123. Id. The Court noted that a seizure implicates different interests from a search. Thus, whereas a
search implicates a privacy interest, a seizure merely implicates a possessory interest. Id. at 806. Under the
circumstances, the seizure of the premises was reasonable because the officers had probable cause to believe the
evidence would be removed or destroyed. Id. at 810. A warrantless search would have been unreasonable, but
except for the protective sweep, the only search conducted was pursuant to the lawfully obtained warrant some
nineteen hours after the initial entry. Id. at 814.
124. Id.
125. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
126. Id. at 535.
127. Id.
128. Id. This initial entry was not pursuant to a warrant. Id.
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marijuana.' 29 In the affidavit in support of the application for a warrant, the agents
did not use any information obtained during the illegal entry.' 3 The petitioners
moved to exclude the discovery and seizure of the marijuana, because they had
been tainted by the illegal search.' The Supreme Court declined to suppress the
evidence, however, because the second legal entry may not have been the result of
the discoveries made during the initial illegal entry. 3 2 According to the Court, even
if evidence is first discovered before a warrant has been applied for, it must not be
excluded if subsequently "re-discovered" during a lawful search pursuant to such a
warrant, if the decision to seek the warrant was not prompted by what had been
discovered during the initial entry, and if no "information obtained during that
entry was presented to the Magistrate and affected his decision to issue the
warrant."' 33 The independent source and fruit of the poisonous tree exceptions
ensure that the prosecution is not put in a worse position, and the criminal
defendant is not put in a better position, than the positions the parties would have
occupied had the illegality never occurred.'-4
3.

Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery

Evidence directly derived from the exploitation of an unconstitutional act is not
excluded if it inevitably would have been discovered during the course of the
criminal investigation.' In Nix v. Williams, the Supreme Court applied the
inevitable discovery exception to the recovery of the body of a murder victim, the
location of which was coerced from the suspect in violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. 36 Based on the illegally obtained information, the
body of the victim was discovered within two and one-half miles of an advancing
search party."' The Court characterized this discovery as inevitable, when the area
where the body was found demonstratively would have been searched within three

129. Id. at 535-36.
130. Id. at 536.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 541. The case was remanded to the district court to determine whether the second search and
seizure fell under the independent source exception. Id. at 542-44.
133. Id. at 542. The dissenting opinion, as characterized by the majority, argued that the evidence must
be suppressed absent "some historically verifiable fact demonstrating that the subsequent search pursuant to a
warrant was wholly unaffected by the prior illegal search," in practice, evidence establishing that the warrant
had already been sought before the agents entered the premises. Id. at 540 n.2 (citing id. at 549 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)). The Court declined this approach by noting that the applicability of the independent source
exception to cases such as this would depend on the intent or mentality of the officers in conducting the
warrantless search. In the case of the warehouse search, the district court had found that the officers conducted
the initial search to guard against the possible destruction of evidence, and not "tosee if there was anything
worth getting a warrant for." Id.
134. See, e.g., id. at 542.
135. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447-48 (1984).
136. Id. at 437, 449-50.
137. Id. at 449.
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to five hours.' Furthermore, the body was concealed in a ditch next to a culvert,
the kind of place the search party had been explicitly instructed to inspect. 3 9
Similar to the independent source doctrine, the doctrine of inevitable discovery is
applied to prevent the prosecution from being subjected to a disadvantage because
of the illegal police conduct.' 40 However, its application requires substantive proof,
by a preponderance of the evidence, as to the information's ultimate or inevitable

discovery through lawful means.' 4 ' According to the Nix court, it is irrelevant
whether the police illegality was willful or occurred in bad faith, since "[a] police
officer who is faced with the opportunity to obtain evidence illegally will rarely, if
to calculate whether the evidence sought would inevitably be
ever, be in a position
42
discovered." 1
In the aftermath of Nix, the circuits have differed as to whether, at the time of the
illegality, an independent line of investigation must have been initiated and be
actively pursued. A number of circuits including the Second, 143 Fifth,' 44 Eighth,' 45
Eleventh' 4" and DC 47 Circuits interpret Nix to expressly require both a reasonable
probability that the evidence would eventually have been discovered, and an actively
pursued and independent line of investigation ongoing at the time of the
constitutional violation. However, the Fifth Circuit recognizes certain circumstances
where the active pursuit requirement may be dispensed with: for instance, where the

138. Id. at 449-50.
139. Id. at 448-49.
140. Id. at 443-44. The Court noted, however, that the independent source doctrine was inapplicable in
this case, because the discovery of the body was a direct result of the Sixth Amendment violation. Id. at 443.
141. Id. at 444.
142. Id. at 445. This argument of course ignores another possibility-that the police may know that they
are likely to obtain a conviction regardless of whether the illegally obtained evidence is introduced. In Nix, the
interrogating officers knew of both an eyewitness and physical evidence linking Williams to the girl's
disappearance. Id. at 434. The officers might reasonably have inferred that a conviction could be obtained
regardless of whether the physical evidence associated with her body was introduced.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 859, 861 (2d Cir. 1992) (requiring a "direct causal
relationship and reasonably close temporal relationship... between what was known and what had occurred
prior to the government misconduct, and the allegedly inevitable discovery of the evidence").
144. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205-06 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the police
must have been "actively pursuing a substantial alternate line of investigation"). It was insufficient that the
agents "could have obtained a warrant" at the time of the illegal search, if they "made no efforts to do so......
Id. at 1206.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Hammons, 152 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
exception is not available unless the government is actively "pursuing a substantial, alternative line of
investigation at the time" of the constitutional violation).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir. 1984) (requiring that "the
lawful means which made discovery inevitable were possessed by the police and were being actively pursued
prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct").
147. See, e.g., United States v. Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty-Eight
Dollars ($639,558) in United States Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 720-21 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that, for the
inevitable discovery exception to apply, the subsequent inventory search (and thus discovery) "must in fact have
been inevitable" and observing that the Supreme Court determined in Nix that "the deterrent effects of the
exclusionary rule reach the point of diminishing returns when, unknown to the officers engaging in illegal
conduct, a separate line of lawful investigation would have come upon the same evidence").
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"independent source comes into being after the misconduct" has occurred. 4'
The active pursuit and ongoing investigation requirements are not articulated
in the First,' 49 Third, 1"° Fourth, 5' Sixth, 152Seventh,'53 Ninthl4 and Tenth'55 Circuits'
inevitable discovery inquiries. These circuits require a determination of what
events or evidence led to the conviction, and whether that evidence would
inevitably have been discovered without the unlawful search. 16 In other words,
"viewing affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful search, what
15 7
would have happened had the unlawful search never occurred"?
As previously noted, the First Circuit recognizes circumstances under which
the requirement for an independent line of investigation may be disregarded.'58 The
test is thus flexible, and may require proof of an ongoing investigation if
circumstances indicate its necessity."' In addition, in cases where the unlawful

148.

Cherry, 759 F.2d at 1206. The Fifth Circuit found that
the interest in deterrence that gave rise to the ... [requirement that an independent line of
investigation must be actively pursued] is not so much implicated since the police at the time
of the misconduct necessarily are not able to know that independent discovery of the evidence
is inevitable and thus cannot rely on a broad application of the inevitable discovery rule to
render admissible evidence actually obtained illegally.

Id. at 1205.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 744-46 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that the
determination should be made on a case-by-case basis, and that there is no necessary requirement of an
independent line of investigation "at the time the illegal search took place."). The First Circuit observed that,
"[i]f the demands that the legal means of obtaining the evidence be both inevitable and independent are
enforced, post hoc suggestions of alternate means" would be "unacceptable" "as a basis for application of the
inevitable discovery exception." Id. at 746.
150. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.3d 192, 195 (3rd Cir. 1998) (requiring that "the
government establish[] that the police, following routine procedures, would inevitably have uncovered the
evidence").
151. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 210 (4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the "alternate line
of investigation" requirement).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 499-500 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding "that an
alternate, independent line of investigation is not required for the inevitable discovery exception to apply").
153. See, e.g., United States v. Fialk, 5 F.3d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that on review, the court
"must determine what events or evidence led to [the] conviction, and then.., decide whether that evidence
would have been discovered without the unlawful search...").
154. See, e.g., United States v. Merriweather, 777 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding it sufficient that
"the second lawful search, which was carried out by agents ignorant of the existence and location of the
[illegally discovered evidence], also resulted in discovery of the [contraband]"). The warrant for the second
search was sought after the illegal entry, but was not based on any information from that search. In addition, the
searching agents were not informed of the presence of the contraband, thus discovering it "independently." Id.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d 984, 986 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that "the inevitable
discovery exception applies whenever an independent investigation inevitably would have led to discovery of
the evidence, whether or not the investigation was ongoing at the time of the illegal police conduct").
156. See cases cited supra notes 149-55.
157. United States v. Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.3d 192, 195 (3rd Cir. 1998) (quoting Kennedy, 61 F.3d
at 498).
158. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
159. United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (1st Cir. 1986).
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search is nevertheless supported by a valid warrant,'O the independent line of
investigation requirement has been substituted for a three-part inquiry. This inquiry
incorporates the justifications for the active pursuit requirement: whether the "legal
means [are] truly independent; [whether] both the use of the legal means and the
discovery by that means [are] truly inevitable; and [whether] ... the application of
the inevitable discovery exception either provide[s] an incentive 6 for police
protection.' 1
misconduct or significantly weaken[s] Fourth Amendment

m. DISCUSSION
In Wilson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court acknowledged, but refused to
decide, the issue of whether evidence seized pursuant to a knock and announce
violation may be "causally disconnected from the constitutional violation" itself,
thereby rendering the exclusionary rule inapplicable."' This issue was also
63
recognized, but not decided, by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Jones,' by
a California court of appeal in People v. Hoag, 6' and by a Florida court of appeals
in Richardson v. State.'6 To date, the issue has been decided in two state courts,
which reached fundamentally different conclusions.
A. State Court Decisions
1. People v. Stevens
In People v. Stevens, the Supreme Court of Michigan concluded that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence seized pursuant to a valid warrant
after a knock and announce violation. 66 The court reasoned that "the 'knock and
announce' statute does not control the execution of a valid search warrant; rather, it
only delays entry."' 167 The ensuing discovery was causally disconnected from the
illegality, because it was made under the authority of the warrant and not because
of the illegal means of gaining entry.' 6 The court reasoned that discovery was

160. If the warrant is issued on information obtained independently of the constitutional violation, there
is no longer any uncertainty as to whether the magistrate would have issued it. Id. at 745. Thus, the sole
remaining concern is that of the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. Id.
161. Id. at 744. The court noted that these factors had been voiced in other circuits as reasons for
adopting an active pursuit requirement. Id.
162. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 937 n.4 (1995).
163. United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 715, 716-17 (7th Cir. 1998).
164. People v. Hoag, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 556, 561 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). For an entertaining dialogue on
the applicability of the inevitable discovery exception to knock and announce violations, see id. at 565-70
(Morrison, J., concurring) and id. at 576-82 (Sims, J., concurring and dissenting).
165. Richardson v. State, 787 So. 2d 906, 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (Altenbernd, J., concurring).
166. People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53, 64 (Mich. 1999), cert. denied sub nom Stevens v. Michigan,
528 U.S. 1164 (2000).
167. Id. at 63.
168. Id. at 64.
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inevitable, since "an occupant would hardly be allowed to contend that, had the
officers announced their presence and waited longer to enter, he would have had
time to destroy the evidence."'" Three months after deciding People v. Stevens, the
Michigan Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in People v. Vasquez.' 7° The court
did not analyze whether a knock and announce violation had taken place, because
"[e]ven if such a violation occurred, suppression of the evidence is not the
appropriate remedy."' 7 ' Meanwhile, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to
review the constitutional issues raised by People v. Stevens.'72

2. Lee v. State
A Maryland Court of Special Appeals reached the opposite conclusion in the
case of Lee v. State."' In Lee, officers armed with a valid warrant disregarded the
knock and announce procedure, entered the suspect's home and subsequently
seized less than an ounce of cocaine hidden in a bedroom drawer. 174 The Maryland
court found that knocking and announcing did more than delay entry into the
house, it entirely change[d] the mode of entry.' ' 75 Thus, even though the evidence
would have been eventually discovered, a merely "predictive outcome" is
insufficient to justify an unconstitutional method of entry. 176 The court noted that
invocation of the inevitable discovery doctrine would constitute the kind of blanket
exception to the knock and announce requirement considered unconstitutional in
Richards.'71 Indeed, application of the doctrine would render the knock and
7
announce requirement entirely meaningless. 1

169. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 1998)).
170. 602 N.W.2d 376, 378-79 (Mich. 1999).
171. Id. at 378.
172. Stevens v. Michigan, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000).
173. 774 A.2d 1183, 1192 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001).
174. Id. at 1185-86.
The task force leader testified that his decision on ... using a battering ram without warning[]
was influenced by the advice of an assistant state's attorney in Harford County.
The ... attorney told the task force leader that he need never to knock and announce when he
has a belief that doing so would lead to the destruction of narcotics.
Id. at 1186.
175. Id. at 1191. The court also noted that "the consequences of [the] illegal entry touch all people inside
a residence, regardless of their relationship to the person or item to be seized .I.." "d.
176. Id. at 1192. This is consistent with the Nix Court's analysis regarding the officers' ability to
calculate whether the evidence would eventually be discovered through lawful means. Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 445-46 (1984). The inevitable discovery exception would otherwise be used to legitimize any illegal
police activity, on the theory that the officers could have used lawful means to seize the evidence or contraband.
177. See Lee, 774 A.2d at 1192.
178. Id.
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B. The Exclusionary Rule Is an Appropriate Remedy for Knock and Announce
Violations
Because the exclusionary rule is invoked only to deter constitutional violations
and not to punish misconduct or cure any pecuniary or physical injury suffered, its
application is limited to instances where a constitutional right of an individual has
been violated." 9 Its application is further limited to instances where its deterrent
objective will be best served.' s The common law principle of knocking and
announcing "is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment."'' The requirement has traditionally been justified on at least four
grounds: (a) preventing the homeowner from mistakenly identifying the officers as
unauthorized intruders; (b) allowing homeowners to redirect officers who arrived
at the wrong address; (c) reducing the destruction of property by providing the
homeowner with the option of admitting the officers peacefully; and (d) helping
"to protect an individual's right to privacy."'' 12 The mistaken identity justification
itself provides a disincentive from entering a dwelling before announcing identity,
and thus exclusion of seized evidence would not serve any additional deterrent
purpose. Furthermore, the lawfulness of a no-knock entry does not depend on
whether property is damaged in the course of the entry.'83 Therefore, the only
remaining question is whether the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is
served by excluding evidence obtained in violation of an individual's privacy after
a failure to knock and announce.
The Fourth Amendment guarantee of security in persons, houses, papers and
effects is essentially a right to privacy against government intrusion.'84 This privacy
right is afforded substantive due process protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.."' A violation of the privacy interest protected by the knock and
announce requirement may rise to a Fourth Amendment violation, 86 and this
interest consequently comes within the penumbra of privacy rights protected by the
Fourth Amendment.' 7 Its violation should therefore be enforceable against the
government "by the same sanction of exclusion as is used" to deter any Fourth
Amendment violation.' 8 However, neither the Fourth Amendment, nor the more
limited right of privacy protected by the knock and announce procedure, offers an
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absolute protection against governmental intrusions.'8 9 The reasonableness inquiry
recognizes legitimate law enforcement concerns in the execution of a search or
seizure.'9 Nevertheless, absent exigent circumstances at the time of the execution
of a warrant, or the antecedent showing of evidence sufficient to obtain a no-knock
warrant, the omission of the knock and announce procedure is a constitutional
violation.91

The Michigan Supreme Court suggested in People v. Stevens that there is no
causal connection between the failure to knock and announce and the seizure of
evidence after entry.' 9' Because the seizure is made pursuant to a validly obtained
warrant, and not as a result of the constitutional violation, the exclusionary rule is
not the appropriate remedy. 93 But this argument disregards the fact that the knock
and announce procedure is an integral part of the "reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment." '94 Whether for purposes of arresting a suspect or searching
for incriminating evidence, "the Fourth Amendment has [historically been
construed to] draw[] a firm line at the entrance to [a dwelling]. Absent exigent
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant."' '
Thus, for purposes of protecting "the sanctity of the home," a reasonable search
requires the imposition of a neutral and detached magistrate "between the zealous
officer and the citizen."' ' But a search is not per se reasonable merely because it is
carried out pursuant to a warrant; under Wilson, the manner of entry is an
additional element that must be considered when assessing the reasonableness of
the search. 9' Thus, notwithstanding the acquisition of a warrant, "an officer's
unannounced entry into a [dwelling may] be unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment."' 98 The Supreme Court prohibited the states from creating per se
exceptions to the knock and announce requirement, because the manner in which
the entry was conducted must always be subject to post facto judicial scrutiny.' 99
Therefore, evidence is not excluded after a no-knock entry because it was seized as
a result of the procedural violation; it is excluded because the entire search was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment notwithstanding the procurement of a
valid warrant.
In Stevens, the court further suggested that alternative remedies are available to
cure the knock and announce omission--the offending officers may face
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departmental sanctions and civil liability." ° Of course, the individual seeking civil
damages faces severe hardship; an action for trespass or property damage may not
yield a substantial verdict, a jury may hesitate to award damages against an officer
who reasonably believed he performed his sworn duty, and a jury may be equally
hesitant to compensate a culpable plaintiff in spite of police misconduct.' ° In
addition, neither departmental sanctions nor civil liability are aimed at deterring
violations of constitutionally protected rights. As a consequence, courts have
repeatedly found that those remedies are insufficient to protect the constitutional
interests at stake. 20
Finally, an analysis of the applicability of the exclusionary remedy must
necessarily include the second justification for its existence-the imperative of
judicial integrity. According to Justice Holmes, "no distinction can be [made]
between the Government as [a] prosecutor and the Government as [a] judge. 2 3 A
government of laws is imperiled if it fails to observe and abide by the law;
violation of one law in order to secure a criminal conviction under another "breeds
[a] contempt for the law" that may lead to "anarchy." ' It is undisputed that the
knock and announce requirement is the law-it is codified in Title 18 of the United
States Code and, more importantly, its adherence has been constitutionally
mandated by judicial construction. 2°6 Thus, should the government allow the
omission of the knock and announce principle in order to secure a conviction, it has
done more than assist in the violation of the law-it has willfully disregarded "the
charter of its own existence." 2°0 Judge (later Justice) Cardozo lamented that
application of the exclusionary rule means "[t]he criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered.""" But the alternative appears even less appealing-that
the criminal is convicted only because the constable and judge did not abide by the
Constitution they were sworn to uphold.
C. The Inevitable Discovery Exception Is not Applicable to Knock and Announce
Violations
It seems obvious that every coerced confession or unreasonable search or
seizure puts the prosecution at a strategic disadvantage, because the illegal conduct
forever taints the evidence and precludes its introduction against the accused. The
inevitable discovery exception has evolved to ensure "the prosecution is not put in
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a worse position," or the criminal defendant in a better position, because of the
police misconduct.2 Thus, the exclusionary rule is not applied if the prosecutor
can show, "by a preponderance of the evidence that the [evidence or
confession] ... inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means....,,1
Under those circumstances, "the deterrence rationale [of the exclusionary rule] has
so little basis that the evidence should be received."21' The circuits are split on
whether the alternative investigation must have been initiated and be actively
pursued at the time of the initial discovery or seizure.
Should the inevitable discovery exception require a separate line of
investigation initiated at the time of the knock and announce violation, the analysis
must simply focus on whether the alternative investigation would inevitably have
led to the discovery of the evidence. An illuminating hypothetical is an entry
pursuant to a valid search warrant where the knock and announce procedure is
omitted and no exigent circumstances existed. If the illegal entry leads to plainview seizure of evidence, such evidence may, for instance, inevitably have been
discovered by a separate investigative team arriving two minutes later with a
warrant for the arrest of the inhabitants of the dwelling. However, by no means can
the initial entry be construed as a contemporaneous and alternative line of
investigation; once the officers have crossed the threshold, that search and seizure
is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and the evidence discovered
thereafter is tainted by the illegal entry.
If, on the other hand, the exception merely requires the discovery of unlawfully
obtained evidence be inevitable, the analysis must necessarily resolve the issue of
whether, at the time just before the illegality occurred, the search or seizure would
have been inevitable had the illegality never occurred. The Stevens court suggested
that because the officers entered the house under color of a valid warrant, the
evidence would inevitably have been discovered had the officers followed the
knock and announce procedure before entering the home." Relying on dicta from
U.S. v. Jones, the court reasoned that the defendant could hardly contend he would
have been able to destroy the evidence had the police delayed entry by adhering to
proper procedures. 214 Such a conclusion is more than mere speculation, because the
evidence seized was clearly present and discoverable.
However, the argument disregards the ultimate purpose behind the inevitable
discovery exception. In order to ensure the prosecution was not disadvantaged by
the illegality, the Nix Court required proof of "ultimate or inevitable discovery.",215
Only with this quantum of proof did the deterrence rationale behind the
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exclusionary rule have "so little basis" so as to render the rule inapplicable. But
in order to establish "ultimate or inevitable discovery" the question cannot simply
be whether the evidence would have been discovered had the officers acted
differently; it must be whether the evidence would have been discovered had the
illegal search never occurred. If the officers in possession of the issued warrant
enter illegally, there can be no ultimate or inevitable discovery by lawful means.
The only possible lawful search, pursuant to the warrant, was tainted by the illegal
entry.

In addition, the Nix Court held that proof of whether the police acted in bad
faith was not required, because at the time of the violation the offending agent
would be unlikely to be able to determine whether the evidence will inevitably be
discovered through lawful means."' The situation is of course different for the
officer armed with a valid search warrant who chooses to depart from the knock
and announce procedure. Under few circumstances can it be said that the officer is
unable to realize the consequences of the contemplated act or the inevitable
admission of any evidence discovered notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of
the search.:'
Finally, the First Circuit's test for inevitable discovery addresses two additional
considerations associated with the application of inevitable discovery to any illegally
obtained evidence-whether its invocation will "provide an incentive for police
misconduct or significantly weaken [F]ourth [A]mendment protection., 21 9 In the
context of knock and announce violations, its invocation will most likely do both. If
all evidence obtained pursuant to a valid warrant is admissible notwithstanding noncompliance with the knock and announce procedure, this element of the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness inquiry is superfluous. Consequently, the area of Fourth
Amendment privacy protection relating to the manner in which a home may be
entered will be severely diminished. In addition, the automatic application of the
inevitable discovery exception will remove the strongest incentive for adhering to the
knock and announce procedure; as the California Supreme Court observed, sanctions
short of exclusion have been insufficient to deter constitutional violations. 2 In
Richards, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a blanket exception to the knock
and announce requirement based on the type of crime investigated could easily be
expanded to the point where the "knock-and-announce element of the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement would be meaningless., 221 It is
consequently not constitutionally permissible to dispose of the knock and announce
requirement altogether.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The knock and announce requirement is codified in Title 18 of the United
States Code, 222 and its omission may constitute an unreasonable search or seizure
under the Fourth Amendment.2 3 The Michigan Supreme Court has held that the
exclusionary rule is not the proper remedy for knock and announce violations, and
any evidence seized after such a violation is admissible under the inevitable
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. 2 4 A Maryland court of appeals
reached the opposite conclusion, and applied the exclusionary rule to evidence
seized after a knock and announce violation. 2
The exclusionary rule is the judicially created remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations, and should be applied also to violations of the knock and announce
procedure. Omission of this procedure, unless justified by exigent circumstances,
renders the entire search or seizure unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The exclusionary rule serves to deter future unconstitutional conduct, and
alternative remedies have been demonstratively unsuccessful in deterring such
conduct. 226 By excluding unlawfully obtained evidence, the judiciary also ensures
that it does not become an "accomplice" to the officer's "willful disobedience" of
the law.227
The doctrine of inevitable discovery is not applicable to knock and announce
violations. A number of jurisdictions require that the government prove inevitable
discovery through an independent, ongoing and actively pursued line of
investigation. 28 Even without this requirement, the ultimate purpose behind the
inevitable discovery exception would not be served by its invocation. 2' 9 The
individual officer would not have any effective deterrent preventing the omission
of the knock and announce procedure, and the consistent admission of evidence
after such violations would severely limit Fourth Amendment protection.
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